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ON THE ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS OF ROBUST ESTIMATORS
BY ERHAN BAYAKTAR∗,‡ , LIFENG LAI†,§
University of Michigan‡ and University of California, Davis§
Motivated by recent data analytics applications, we study the adversarial
robustness of robust estimators. Instead of assuming that only a fraction of the
data points are outliers as considered in the classic robust estimation setup, in
this paper, we consider an adversarial setup in which an attacker can observe
the whole dataset and can modify all data samples in an adversarial manner
so as to maximize the estimation error caused by his attack. We characterize
the attacker’s optimal attack strategy, and further introduce adversarial influ-
ence function (AIF) to quantify an estimator’s sensitivity to such adversarial
attacks. We provide an approach to characterize AIF for any given robust esti-
mator, and then design optimal estimator that minimizes AIF, which implies it
is least sensitive to adversarial attacks and hence is most robust against adver-
sarial attacks. From this characterization, we identify a tradeoff between AIF
(i.e., robustness against adversarial attack) and influence function, a quantity
used in classic robust estimators to measure robustness against outliers, and
design estimators that strike a desirable tradeoff between these two quantities.
1. Introduction. Robust estimation is a classic topic that addresses the out-
lier or model uncertainty issues. In the existing setup, a certain percentage of the
data points are assumed to be outliers. Various concepts such as influence function
(IF), breakdown point, and change of variance etc were developed to quantify the
robustness of estimators against the presence of outliers, please see [1, 2, 3] and
references therein for details.
These concepts are very useful for the classic setup where a fraction (up to 50%)
of data points are outliers while the remaining data come from the true distribution.
In this paper, motivated by recent interest in data analytics, we address the issue
of adversarial robustness. In a typical data analytics setup, a dataset is stored in a
database. If an attacker has access to the database, he can modify all data points
(i.e., up to 100%) in an adversarial manner, and hence the existing results on ro-
bust statistics are not directly applicable anymore. This scenario also arises in the
adversarial example phenomena in deep neural networks that have attracted signif-
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2 E. BAYAKTAR AND L. LAI
icant recent research interests [4, 5, 6]. In the adversarial example in deep neural
networks, by making small but carefully chosen changes on the image, the attacker
can mislead neural network to make wrong decisions, even though a human will
hardly notice changes on the modified image. Certainly, if the attacker can modify
all data and no further restrictions on attacker’s capability are imposed, then no
meaningful estimator can be constructed (this can be viewed as 100% of the data
are modified in the classic setup). In this paper, we investigate the scenario that the
total amount of change measured by `p norm is limited, and we will study how
these quantities will affect the estimation performance. This type of constraints are
reasonable and are motivated by real life examples. For example, in generating ad-
versarial examples in images [4], the total distortion should be limited, otherwise
human eyes will be able to detect such changes. Towards this goal, we introduce
the concept of adversarial influence function (AIF) to quantify how sensitive an
estimator is to adversarial attacks.
We first focus on the scenario with a given data set. For this scenario, we char-
acterize the optimal attack vector that the attacker, who observes the whole data
set, can employ to maximize the estimation error. Using this characterization, we
can then analyze AIF of any given estimator. This analysis enables us to design
estimators that are robust to adversarial attacks. In particular, from the estimator’s
perspective, one would like to design an estimator that minimizes AIF, which im-
plies that such an estimator is least sensitive to adversarial attacks and hence is
most robust against adversarial attacks. We derive universal lower bounds on AIF
and characterize the conditions under which an estimator can achieve this lower
bound (and hence is most robustness against adversarial attacks). We then illus-
trate these results for two specific models: location estimators and scale estimators.
With the results in the given sample scenario, we then extend our study to the
population scenario, in which we investigate the behavior of AIF as the number of
samples increases. For this case, we identify a tradeoff between robustness against
adversarial attacks vs robustness against outliers. In particular, we first characterize
the optimal estimator that minimizes AIF. However, the estimator that minimizes
AIF has a poor performance in term of IF [3, 7], a quantity that measures robust-
ness against outliers. Realizing this fact, we then formulate optimization problems
to design estimators that strike a desirable tradeoff between AIF (i.e., robustness
against adversarial attack) and IF (i.e., robustness against outliers). Using tools
from calculus of variations [8, 9], we are able to exploit the unique structure of
our problems and obtain analytical form of the optimal solution. The obtained so-
lution share similar interpretation as classic robust estimators that it will carefully
trim data points that are from the distribution tails. However, the detailed form and
thresholds are determined by different criteria.
In the above discussion, we mainly focus on a class of widely used robust esti-
ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS OF ROBUST ESTIMATORS 3
mators: M -estimator. However, the developed tools and analysis can be extended
to analyze other types of robust estimators. In this paper, we will use L-estimator
as an example to discuss how to extend the analysis to other types of estimators.
Our paper is related to a growing list of recent work on adversarial machine
learning. Here we give several examples on data poisoning attack that is related to
our work. For example, [10] considers an adversarial principal component analy-
sis (PCA) problem in which an attacker adds an extra data point in an adversarial
manner so as to maximize the error of subspace estimated by PCA. [11] investi-
gates data poisoning attack in regression problems, in which the attacker adds data
points to the training dataset with the goal of introducing errors into or guiding
the results of regression models. [12] studies an attack that inserts carefully chosen
data points to the training set for support vector machine. [13] considers learning
problems from untrusted data. In particular, under the assumption that at least α
percent of data points are drawn from a distribution of interest, [13] considers two
frameworks: 1) list-decodable learning, whose goal is to return a list of answers,
with the guarantee that at least one of them is accurate; and 2) semi-verified learn-
ing, in which one has a small dataset of trusted data that can be leveraged to enable
the accurate extraction of information from a much larger but untrusted dataset. A
major difference between our work and these interesting work is that the existing
work assume that a certain percentage of data points are not compromised, while
in our work all data points could be compromised.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce
our problem formulation. In Section 3, we introduce the necessary background.
In Section 4, we investigate AIF for the given sample scenario. In Section 5, we
consider the population scenario. We extend the study to L-estimator in Section 6.
Numerical examples are given in Section 7. Finally, we offer concluding remarks
in Section 8.
2. Model.
We consider an adversarially robust parameter estimation problem in which the
adversary has access to the whole dataset. In particular, we have a given data set
x = {x1, · · · , xN}, in which xn are i.i.d realizations of random variable X that
has cumulative density function (cdf) Fθ(x) with unknown parameter θ. We will
use fθ(x) to denote the corresponding probability density function (pdf). From this
given data set, we would like to estimate the unknown parameter θ. However, as
the adversary has access to the whole dataset, it will modify the data to x∆ =
x + ∆x := {x1 + ∆x1, · · · , xN + ∆xN}, in which ∆x = {∆x1, · · · ,∆xN}
is the attack vector chosen by the adversary after observing x. We will discuss
the attacker’s optimal attack strategy in choosing ∆x in the sequel. In the classic
robust estimation setup, it is typically assume that some percentage (up to 50%)
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of the data points are outliers, that is some entries in ∆x are nonzero while the
remainders are zero. In this work, we consider the case where the attacker can
modify all data points, which is a more suitable setup for recent data analytical
applications. However, certain restrictions need to be put on ∆x, otherwise the
estimation problem will not be meaningful. In this paper, we assume that
1
N
||∆x||pp ≤ ηp,
in which || · ||p is the `p norm. The normalization factor N implies that the per-
dimension change (on average) is upper-bound by ηp. As mentioned in the in-
troduction, this type of constraints are reasonable and are motivated by real life
examples. The classic setup can be viewed as a special case of our formulation
by letting p → 0, i.e., the classic setup has constraint on the total number of data
points that the attacker can modify.
Following notation used in robust statistics [2, 3], we will use TN (x) to denote
an estimator. For a given estimator TN , we would like to characterize how sensitive
the estimator is with respect to the adversarial attack. In this paper, we consider a
scenario where the goal of the attacker is to maximize the estimation error caused
by the attack. In particular, the attacker aims to choose ∆x by solving the following
optimization problem
max
∆x
|TN (x + ∆x)− TN (x)|,(2.1)
s.t.
1
N
||∆x||pp ≤ ηp.
We use ∆TN (x) to denote the optimal value obtained from the optimization
problem (2.1), and define the adversarial influence function (AIF) of estimator TN
at x under `p norm constraint as
AIF(TN ,x, p) = lim
η↓0
∆TN (x)
η
.
This quantity, a generalization of the concept of IF used in classic robust estimation
(we will briefly review IF in Section 3), quantifies the asymptotic rate at which the
attacker can introduce estimation error through its attack.
From the defender’s perspective, the smaller AIF is, the more robust the esti-
mator is. In this paper, building on the characterization of AIF(TN ,x, p), we will
characterize the optimal estimator TN , among a certain class of estimators T , that
minimizes AIF(TN ,x, p). In particular, we will investigate
min
TN∈T
AIF(TN ,x, p).
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We will show that, for certain class of T , the optimal TN is independent of x and
p, which is a very desirable property.
Note that AIF(TN ,x, p) depends on the data realization x. Based on the char-
acterization of AIF for a given data realization x of length N , we will then study
the population version of AIF where each entry of X = {X1, · · · , XN} is i.i.d
generated by Fθ. We will examine the behavior of AIF(TN ,X, p) as N increases.
Following the convention in robust statistics, we will assume that there exists a
functional T such that
TN (X)→ T (Fθ)(2.2)
in probability asN →∞. We will see that for a large class of estimators AIF(TN ,X, p)
has a well-defined limit as N →∞. We will use AIF(T, Fθ, p) to denote this limit
when it exists.
Similarly, from the defense’s perspective, we would like to design an estima-
tor that is least sensitive to the adversarial attack. Again, we will characterize
the optimal estimator T , among a certain class of estimators T , that minimizes
AIF(T, Fθ, p). That is, for a certain class of estimators T , we will solve
min
T∈T
AIF(T, Fθ, p).(2.3)
It will be clear in the sequel that the solution to the optimization problem (2.3),
even though is robust against adversarial attacks, has poor performance in guarding
against outliers. This motivates us to design estimators that strike a desirable trade-
off between these two robustness measures. In particular, we will solve (2.3) with
an additional constraint on IF. We will need to use tools from calculus of variations
for this purpose.
3. Background. In this section, we briefly review results from classic robust
estimator literature that are closely related to our study.
3.1. Influence Function (IF). As mentioned above, in the classic robust esti-
mation setup, it is assumed that a fraction η of data points are outliers, while the
remainder of data points are generated from the true distribution Fθ. For a given
estimator T , the concept of IF introduced by Hamper [7] is defined
IF(x, T, Fθ) = lim
η↓0
T ((1− η)Fθ + ηδx)− T (Fθ)
η
.
In this definition, δx is a distribution that puts mass 1 at point x, T (Fθ), introduced
in (2.2), is the obtained estimate when all data points are generated i.i.d from Fθ,
and T ((1−η)Fθ +ηδx) is the obtained estimate when 1−η fraction of data points
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are generated i.i.d from Fθ while η fraction of the data points are at x. Hence,
IF(x, T, Fθ) measures the asymptotic influence of having outliers at point x as
η ↓ 0.
To measure the influence of the worst outliers, [7] then further introduced the
concept of gross-error sensitivity of T by taking sup over the absolute value of
IF(x, T, Fθ):
γ∗(T, Fθ) = sup
x
|IF(x, T, Fθ)|.
Intuitively speaking, γ∗(T, Fθ) can be viewed as the solution of our problem
setup for the special case of p = 0.
The values of IF(x, T, Fθ) and γ∗(T, Fθ) have been characterized for various
class of estimators. Furthermore, under certain conditions, optimal estimator T
that minimizes these quantities have been established. Some of these results will
be introduced in later sections. More details can be found in [2, 3].
3.2. M -Estimator. In this paper, we will mainly focus on a class of commonly
used estimator in robust statistic:M -estimator [1], in which one obtains an estimate
TN (x) of θ by solving
N∑
n=1
ψ(xn, TN ) = 0.(3.1)
Here ψ(xn, θ) is a function of data xn and parameter θ to be estimated. Differ-
ent choices of ψ lead to different robust estimators. For example, the most likely
estimator (MLE) can be obtained by setting ψ = −f ′θ/fθ.
As the form ofψ determines TN , in the remainder of the paper, we will useψ and
TN interchangeably. For example, we will denote AIF(TN ,x, p) as AIF(ψ,x, p).
Similarly, we will denote IF(x, T, Fθ) as IF(x, ψ, Fθ).
It is typically assumed that ψ(x, θ) is continuous and almost everywhere dif-
ferentiable. This assumption is valid for all ψ’s that are commonly used. It is also
typically assume the estimator is Fisher consistent [3]:
EFθ [ψ(X, θ)] = 0,(3.2)
in which EFθ means expectation under Fθ. Intuitively speaking, this implies that
the true parameter θ is the solution of the M -estimator if there are increasingly
more i.i.d. data points generated from Fθ.
For M -estimator, IF(x, ψ, Fθ) was shown to be
IF(x, ψ, Fθ) =
ψ(x, T (Fθ))
− ∫ ∂∂θ [ψ(y, θ)]θ=T (Fθ)dFθ(y) ,
see (2.3.5) of [3].
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4. The Fixed Sample Case. In this section, we focus on analyzing AIF(ψ,x, p)
for a given dataset x. We will extend the study to the population case and analyze
AIF(ψ, Fθ, p) in Section 5.
4.1. General ψ. We will first characterize AIF(ψ,x, p) for general ψ, and will
then specialize the results to specific problems in later sections. For any given ψ
that is continuous and almost everywhere differentiable, we have the following
theorem that characterizes AIF(ψ,x, p).
THEOREM 4.1. When p = 1,
AIF(ψ,x, 1) =
∣∣ ∂
∂x [ψ]x=xn∗ ,θ=TN
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N N∑
n=1
∂
∂θ [ψ]x=xn,θ=TN
∣∣∣∣ ,
where
n∗ = arg max
n
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂x [ψ]x=xn,θ=TN
∣∣∣∣ .(4.1)
For p > 1, we have
AIF(ψ,x, p) =
(
1
N
N∑
n=1
∣∣ ∂
∂x [ψ]x=xn,θ=TN
∣∣ pp−1) p−1p∣∣∣∣ 1N N∑
n=1
∂
∂θ [ψ]x=xn,θ=TN
∣∣∣∣ .
PROOF. Please see Appendix A for detailed proof.
From Theorem 4.1, we can characterize the form of ψ that leads to the smallest
AIF, i.e., the most robust M -estimator against adversarial attacks.
COROLLARY 4.1.
AIF(ψ,x, p) ≥
1
N
N∑
n=1
∣∣ ∂
∂x [ψ]x=xn,θ=TN
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N N∑
n=1
∂
∂θ [ψ]x=xn,θ=TN
∣∣∣∣ ,
and the equality holds when∣∣∣∣ ∂∂x [ψ]x=x1,θ=TN
∣∣∣∣ = · · · = ∣∣∣∣ ∂∂x [ψ]x=xN ,θ=TN
∣∣∣∣ .
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PROOF. For p > 1, it is easy to check that x(p−1)/p is a concave function when
x ≥ 0. Hence, using Jensen’s inequality, we have(
1
N
N∑
n=1
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂x [ψ]x=xn,θ=TN
∣∣∣∣ pp−1
) p−1
p
≥ 1
N
N∑
n=1
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂x [ψ]x=xn,θ=TN
∣∣∣∣ ,
and the equality holds when
∣∣ ∂
∂x [ψ]x=xn,θ=TN
∣∣ is a constant with respect to n.
This corollary implies that, from defender’s perspective, we should designψ(x, θ)
such that
∣∣ ∂
∂x [ψ]
∣∣ is constant in x. It is also interesting that, this result holds for any
value of p. And hence we can design an estimator without knowledge about which
constraint the attacker is using.
4.2. Specific Estimators. To illustrate the results obtained above, we specialize
results to location estimators and scale estimators.
4.2.1. Location Estimator. For location estimator models, Fθ(x) = F0(x−θ),
and hence it is natural to use ψ(x, θ) = ψ(x − θ), see [2, 3]. For this model, it is
easy to check that
∂
∂x
[ψ]x=xn,θ=TN = ψ
′
(xn − TN ),
∂
∂θ
[ψ]x=xn,θ=TN = −ψ
′
(xn − TN ).
Plugging these two equations in the AIF expressions in Theorem 4.1, for the case
with p = 1, we have
AIF(ψ,x, 1) =
∣∣∣Nψ′(xn∗ − TN )∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ N∑
n=1
ψ′(xn − TN )
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 1,
for which the equality holds when ψ
′
(xn − TN ) is a constant with respect to n.
For the case with p > 1, we have
AIF(ψ,x, p) =
(
1
N
N∑
n=1
∣∣∣ψ′(xn − TN )∣∣∣ pp−1) p−1p∣∣∣∣ 1N N∑
n=1
ψ′(xn − TN )
∣∣∣∣(4.2)
(a)
≥
1
N
N∑
n=1
∣∣∣ψ′(xn − TN )∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N N∑
n=1
ψ′(xn − TN )
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 1,
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in which (a) is due to Jensen’s inequality. Both inequalities will hold if ψ
′
(xn−TN )
is a constant in n.
EXAMPLE 4.1. Consider an estimator with ψ(xn − TN ) = xn − TN . This
estimator is simply the empirical sample mean. It is easy to see that ψ
′
(x) is a
constant in n, which implies that this choice of ψ has AIF(ψ,x, p) = 1. It achieves
the lower bound established above, regardless of the value of x and p. Hence,
it is the most robust estimator against adversarial attacks. However, as we will
discuss in Section 5, this choice of ψ is not robust against outliers. In Section 5, we
will design estimators that strike a desirable balance between robustness against
outliers and robustness against adversarial attacks.
EXAMPLE 4.2. Consider the Huber estimator [1] with
ψ(xn − TN ) = min{b,max{xn − TN ,−b}},
parameterized by a parameter 0 < b < ∞. Using (4.2), it is easy to check that
AIF(ψ,x, p) =
√
1/β, in which β is the percentage of points in x such that
|xn − TN | < b. It is clear that Huber estimator, while being more robust against
outliers [2], is less robust against than adversarial attacks than the empirical mean
estimator.
4.2.2. Scale Estimator. The scale model [2, 3] is given by Fθ(x) = F1(x/θ),
and it is typical to consider ψ(x, θ) = ψ(x/θ). It is easy to check that for ψ with
this form, we have
∂
∂x
[ψ]x=xn,θ=TN =
ψ
′
(xn/TN )
TN
,
∂
∂θ
[ψ]x=xn,θ=TN =
−xnψ′(xn/TN )
T 2N
.
Using Theorem 4.1, for the case with p = 1, we obtain
AIF(ψ,x, 1) =
∣∣∣∣N ψ′ (xn∗/TN )TN
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ N∑
n=1
−xnψ′ (xn/TN )
T 2N
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣ψ′(xn∗/TN )∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N N∑
n=1
xn/TNψ
′(xn/TN )
∣∣∣∣ ,(4.3)
in which n∗ is defined in (4.1).
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When p > 1, we have
AIF(ψ,x, p) =
(
1
N
N∑
n=1
∣∣∣∣ψ′ (xn/TN )TN
∣∣∣∣ pp−1
) p−1
p
∣∣∣∣ 1N N∑
n=1
−xnψ′ (xn/TN )
T 2N
∣∣∣∣
=
(
1
N
N∑
n=1
∣∣∣ψ′(xn/TN )∣∣∣ pp−1) p−1p∣∣∣∣ 1N N∑
n=1
xn/TNψ
′(xn/TN )
∣∣∣∣ .(4.4)
EXAMPLE 4.3. Consider MLE for variance of zero-mean Gaussian random
variables, which corresponds to ψ(x) = −x(φ′(x)/φ(x)) − 1 = x2 − 1. Here,
φ(x) is the pdf of zero mean variance one Gaussian random variable. For this
choice of ψ, we have TN = 1N
∑N
n=1 x
2
n and ψ
′
(xn/TN ) = 2xn/TN . Plugging
these values into (4.3), we obtain
AIF(ψ,x, 1) = |x∗n|.
Using (4.4), we have
AIF(ψ,x, p) =
(
1
N
N∑
n=1
|xn|
p
p−1
) p−1
p
,
from which we know that when p = 2, AIF(ψ,x, 2) =
√
TN =
√
1
N
∑N
n=1 x
2
n.
5. Population Case. With the results on the fixed dataset case, we now con-
sider the population version where Xn are i.i.d from Fθ, and analyze the behavior
of AIF as N → ∞. Following the convention in classic robust statistic literature,
we will focus on the case in which the estimator is Fisher consistent as defined
in (3.2). Under a broad range of regularity conditions, [2] shows that TN
a.s.→ θ.
As a result, following similar arguments in Proposition 3 of [14], as N → ∞ in
Theorem 4.1, we have,
AIF(ψ,x, 1) =
∣∣ ∂
∂x [ψ]x=xn∗ ,θ=TN
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N N∑
n=1
∂
∂θ [ψ]x=xn,θ=TN
∣∣∣∣
a.s.→
max
x
∣∣ ∂
∂x [ψ](x, θ)
∣∣∣∣EFθ [ ∂∂θ [ψ](X, θ)]∣∣ := AIF(ψ,Fθ, 1).(5.1)
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For p > 1, we have
AIF(ψ,x, p) =
(
1
N
N∑
n=1
∣∣∣ ∂∂xn [ψ]x=xn,θ=TN ∣∣∣ pp−1)
p−1
p
∣∣∣∣ 1N N∑
n=1
∂
∂θ [ψ]x=xn,θ=TN
∣∣∣∣
a.s.→
(
EFθ
[∣∣ ∂
∂x [ψ](X, θ)
∣∣ pp−1 ]) p−1p∣∣EFθ [ ∂∂θ [ψ](X, θ)]∣∣ := AIF(ψ,Fθ, p).(5.2)
5.1. Location Estimator. We now specialize the results to the location model
mentioned above. We will first characterize ψ that minimizes AIF(ψ, Fθ, p). We
will then discuss the tradeoff between the robustness to outliers and robustness to
adversarial attacks, and will characterize the optimal ψ that achieves this tradeoff.
In the location estimator, we will assume ψ(x, θ) is monotonic in θ, which will
satisfy the regularity conditions established in [2].
5.1.1. Minimizing AIF(ψ,Fθ, p). For p = 1, using (5.1), we have
AIF(ψ, Fθ, 1) =
max
x
∣∣∣ψ′(x− θ)∣∣∣
|EFθ [ψ′(X − θ)]|
.
For p > 1, using (5.2), we obtain
AIF(ψ,Fθ, p) =
(
EFθ
[∣∣∣ψ′(X − θ)∣∣∣ pp−1]) p−1p
|EFθ [ψ′(X − θ)]|
.(5.3)
In particular, for p = 2, we have
AIF(ψ, Fθ, 2) =
√
EFθ [ψ
′(X − θ)2]
(EFθ [ψ
′(X − θ)])2 .
From (5.3) and using Jensen’s equality, we have
AIF(ψ, Fθ, p) ≥ 1,
for which the equality holds when ψ
′
(x− θ) is constant in x.
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5.1.2. Tradeoff between AIF (ψ,Fθ, p) and γ∗(ψ, Fθ). From (2.3.12) of [3],
we know that the influence function of the location estimator specified by ψ is
IF(x, ψ, Fθ) =
ψ(x− θ)
EFθ [ψ
′(X − θ)] ,
and hence
γ∗(ψ, Fθ) = sup
x
∣∣∣∣ ψ(x− θ)EFθ [ψ′(X − θ)]
∣∣∣∣ .
As a result, if ψ
′
(X−θ) is a constant that minimizes AIF(ψ, Fθ, p) as discussed in
Section 5.1.1, then γ∗(ψ,Fθ) might go to∞, especially for those distributions with
unbounded support. To achieve a desirable tradeoff between robustness to outliers
(i.e., γ∗(ψ,Fθ) is small) and robustness to adversarial attacks (i.e., AIF(ψ,Fθ, p)
is small), in the following, we characterize the optimal estimator that minimizes
AIF(ψ, Fθ, p) subject to a constraint on γ∗(ψ, Fθ).
min AIF(ψ,F, 2)(5.4)
s.t. γ∗(ψ,Fθ) ≤ ξ,(5.5)
EFθ [ψ(X − θ)] = 0,(5.6)
ψ
′
(x) ≥ 0,
in which constraint (5.5) implies that γ∗(ψ, Fθ) is upperbounded by a positive con-
stant ξ, constraint (5.6) implies that ψ is Fisher consistent, and the last constraint
comes from the condition that ψ is monotonic in θ.
For location estimator, fθ(x) = f0(x − θ), so all quantities in (5.4) remain the
same by assuming θ = 0 [3]. Hence, in the following, we will solve this optimiza-
tion problem assuming θ = 0.
THEOREM 5.1. The solution to the optimization problem (5.4) has the follow-
ing structure:
• ψ′(x) satisfies
ψ
′
(x) =(5.7) {
ν∗ − ϑ∗2+(ϑ∗1−ϑ∗2)F0(x)f0(x) , ν∗f0(x) > ϑ∗1F0(x) + ϑ∗2(1− F0(x));
0, otherwise,
in which the parameters ν∗, ϑ∗1 ≥ 0 and ϑ∗2 ≥ 0 are parameters chosen to
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satisfy the following conditions
EF0 [ψ
′
(X)] = 1,(5.8)
ϑ∗1
(∫
ψ
′
(x)F0(x)dx− ξ
)
= 0,(5.9)
ϑ∗2
(
EF0
[∫ X
−∞
ψ
′
(t)dt
]
− ξ
)
= 0,(5.10)
along with
∫
ψ
′
(x)F0(x)dx ≤ ξ and EF0
[∫ X
−∞ ψ
′
(t)dt
]
≤ ξ.
• ψ(−∞) is set as −EF0
[∫ X
−∞ ψ
′
(t)dt
]
.
PROOF. Please see Appendix B for details.
The condition ν∗f0(x) > ϑ∗1F0(x) +ϑ∗2(1−F0(x)) has a natural interpretation.
It will trim data points from the tails. In particular, when x is left tail (i.e. F0 is
small), 1− F0 will be close to 1. On the other hand, when x is in the right tail (i.e.
1−F0 is small), F0 will be close to 1. In these regions, ψ′ = 0 if the corresponding
f0(x) is small. Figure 1 illustrates the scenario for estimating the mean of Gaussian
variables for the case assuming ϑ∗1 > ϑ∗2. It is easy to check that, in this example, if
ν∗ > 2pi(ϑ∗1 + ϑ∗2), there exist a and b such that ψ
′
(x) = 0 when x < a or x > b.
Correspondingly, ψ(x) is given as
ψ(x) =

ξ x ≥ b
−ξ + ∫ xa ψ′(t)dt a < x < b
−ξ x < a
.
a b
FIG 1. Gaussian mean example
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5.2. Scale Estimator. We now specialize the results to the scale model where
Fθ(x) = F1(x/θ). For this model, it is natural to consider ψ(x, θ) = ψ(x/θ) [2, 3].
Similar to the location model, we will first characterizeψ that minimizes AIF(ψ, Fθ, p).
We will then discuss the tradeoff between the robustness to outliers and robustness
to adversarial attacks, and will characterize the optimal ψ that achieves this trade-
off.
For the case with p = 1, using (5.1), we obtain
AIF(ψ,x, 1) =
∣∣∣NTNψ′(xn∗/TN )∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ N∑
n=1
xnψ
′(xn/TN )
∣∣∣∣
a.s.→
max
x
∣∣∣θψ′(x/θ)∣∣∣
|Eθ[Xψ′(X/θ)]| := AIF(ψ, Fθ, 1).
For p > 1, using (5.1), we have
AIF(ψ,x, p) =
(
1
N
N∑
n=1
∣∣∣ψ′(xn/TN )∣∣∣ pp−1) p−1p∣∣∣∣ 1N N∑
n=1
xn/TNψ
′(xn/TN )
∣∣∣∣
a.s.→
(
Eθ
[∣∣∣ψ′(X/θ)∣∣∣ pp−1]) p−1p
|Eθ [X/θψ′(X/θ)]| := AIF(ψ, Fθ, p).
Since in scale model Fθ(x) = F1(x/θ), we have fθ(x) = f1
(
x
θ
)
1
θ , and hence
AIF(ψ, Fθ, p) =
(
EF1
[∣∣∣ψ′(X)∣∣∣ pp−1]) p−1p
|EF1 [Xψ′(X)]|
:= AIF(ψ,F1, p).
For p = 2, we have
AIF(ψ,F1, 2) =
(
EF1
[
ψ
′
(X)2
]) 1
2
|EF1 [Xψ′(X)]|
.(5.11)
5.2.1. Minimizing AIF (ψ, Fθ, p). In the following, among Fisher consistent
estimators, we aim to design ψ
′
that minimizes AIF(ψ, F1, 2).
THEOREM 5.2. The optimal ψ that minimizes AIF(ψ,F1, 2) has the following
structure:
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• For x in the range of f1(x), ψ′ satisfies
ψ
′
(x) =
x
EF1 [X2]
.
• ψ(−∞) is chosen as
ψ(−∞) = −EF1
[∫ X
−∞
ψ
′
(t)dt
]
.
With this choice of ψ(x), the minimal value of AIF(ψ,F1, 2) is 1/
√
EF1 [X2].
PROOF. Please see Appendix C for details.
We note that for scale estimator ∂ψ∂θ = −ψ
′
(x/θ)x/θ2, hence for this particular
choice of ψ
′
in Theorem 5.2, ∂ψ∂θ = −x2/(θ3EF1 [X2]), which means ψ(x, θ) is
monotone in θ. This ensures that the obtained ψ(x) satisfies the regularity condi-
tions [2] mentioned at the beginning of this section.
5.2.2. Tradeoff between AIF (ψ, Fθ, p) and γ∗(ψ, Fθ). Similar to the location
estimation case, we can also design ψ to minimize AIF(ψ, Fθ, p) with a constraint
on γ∗(ψ, Fθ). From (2.3.17) of [3], we know that for scale estimators
IF(x, ψ, Fθ) =
ψ(x/θ)θ
EFθ [X/θψ
′(X/θ)]
.
To facilitate the analysis, we will focus on ψ that is monotonic. Since in scale
model, ψ(x, θ) = ψ(x/θ), we can simply focus on the case of θ = 1. Hence, we
will solve the following optimization problem to strike a desirable tradeoff between
robustness against outliers and robustness against adversarial attacks.
min
EF1
[
ψ
′
(X)2
]
(EF1 [Xψ
′(X)])
2 ,(5.12)
s.t. γ∗(ψ,F1) = sup
x
∣∣∣∣ ψ(x)EF1 [Xψ′(X)]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ξ,(5.13)
EF1 [ψ] = 0,(5.14)
ψ
′
(x) ≥ 0.(5.15)
Here, constraint (5.13) is a constraint on the outliers influence, (5.14) implies that
ψ is Fisher consistent.
THEOREM 5.3. The solution to (5.12) has the following structure:
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• ψ′ has the following form
ψ
′
(x) =(5.16){
ν∗x− ϑ∗2+(ϑ∗1−ϑ∗2)F1(x)f1(x) , ν∗xf1(x) > ϑ∗1F1(x) + ϑ∗2(1− F1(x));
0, otherwise,
in which ν∗, ϑ∗1 ≥ 0 and ϑ∗2 ≥ 0 are chosen to satisfy
EF1 [Xψ
′
(X)] = 1,
ϑ∗1
(∫ ∞
−∞
ψ
′
(x)F1(x)dx− ξ
)
= 0,
ϑ∗2
(
EF1
[∫ X
−∞
ψ
′
(t)dt
]
− ξ
)
= 0,
along with
∫∞
−∞ ψ
′
(x)F1(x)dx ≤ ξ and EF1
[∫ X
−∞ ψ
′
(t)dt
]
≤ ξ.
• ψ(−∞) is set to be −EF1
[∫ X
−∞ ψ
′
(t)dt
]
.
PROOF. The proof follows similar strategy as that of the proof of Theorem 5.1
and 5.2. Details can be found in Appendix D.
Similar to the location estimator case, the condition ν∗xf1(x) > ϑ∗1F1(x) +
ϑ∗2(1− F1(x)) will limit the influences of data points at the tails.
6. Extension: L-estimator. In this section, we briefly discuss how to extend
the analysis above to other class of estimators. We will L-estimator as an example.
L-estimator has the following form [2, 3]:
TN (x) =
N∑
n=1
anx(n),
where x(1) ≤ · · · ≤ x(N) are the ordered sequence of x, and an’s are coefficients.
For example, for location estimator, a natural choice of an is
an =
∫ n/N
(n−1)/N h(t)dt∫ 1
0 h(t)dt
,(6.1)
for a given function h(t) such that
∫ 1
0 h(t)dt 6= 0. For example, setting h(t) =
δ(t− 1/2) leads to the median estimator.
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We first look at the given sample scenario. Let x˜ = x + ∆x, and let x˜(1) ≤
· · · ≤ x˜(N) be the ordered sequence of x˜. Hence,
TN (x + ∆x) =
N∑
n=1
anx˜(n).(6.2)
For general ∆x, the ordering of x+ ∆x may not necessarily be the same as the
ordering of x. For example, x˜(1) might come from x(2), i.e., x˜(1) = x(2) +∆(x(2)).
This possibility could make the following analysis messy. However, it is easy to
show that for any ∆xˆ that makes the ordering of x+∆xˆ different from the ordering
of x, we can find another ∆x such that the ordering of x + ∆x is the same as the
ordering of x and ||∆x||p ≤ ||∆xˆ||p. With this, we can limit (6.2) to the following
form
TN (x + ∆x) =
N∑
n=1
an(x(n) + ∆(x(n))).
Hence
TN (x + ∆x)− TN (x) =
N∑
n=1
an∆x(n),
and (2.1) becomes
min −
N∑
n=1
an∆x(n),
s.t.
1
N
||∆x||pp ≤ ηp.
Using the exactly same approach as those in the proof of Theorem 4.1, we have
the following characterization. For p = 1, let n∗ = arg max
n
|an|,
∆x∗(n∗) = sign {an∗}Nη,
and ∆x∗(n) = 0,∀n 6= n∗. Hence,
AIF(TN ,x, 1) = N |an∗ | .
For p > 1, we have
∆x∗(n) =
|an|1/(p−1)(N)1/p
(
∑ |an|p/(p−1))1/p sign(an)η.
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Hence,
AIF(ψ,x, p) =
∑
an
|an|1/(p−1)(N)1/p
(
∑ |an|p/(p−1))1/p sign(an)
=
N∑
n=1
|an|p/(p−1)(
1
N
N∑
n=1
|an|p/(p−1)
)1/p .(6.3)
When p = 2, this can be simplified to
AIF(TN ,x, 2) =
√
N
N∑
n=1
a2n√
N∑
n=1
a2n
=
√√√√N N∑
n=1
a2n.(6.4)
For example, for α-trimmed estimator [3] defined by
TαN (x) =
1
N − 2bαNc
N−bαNc∑
n=bαNc+1
x(n),
for a given parameter 0 < α < 1/2. For this α-trimmed estimator, using (6.3), we
obtain
AIF(TαN ,x, p) =
N1/p
(N − 2bαNc)1/p .
If ans are chosen as (6.1), then (6.4) simplifies to
AIF(TN ,x, 2) =
√√√√√√√
1
N
N∑
n=1
(∫ n/N
(n−1)/N h(t)dt
)2
(
1
N
∫ 1
0 h(t)dt
)2
≥
√√√√√√√
(
1
N
N∑
n=1
∫ n/N
(n−1)/N h(t)dt
)2
(
1
N
∫ 1
0 h(t)dt
)2
≥ 1,
in which the first inequality is due to Jensen’s inequality, and both inequalities
become equality when an =
∫ n/N
(n−1)/N h(t)dt is a constant in n.
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7. Numerical Examples. In this section, we provide numerical examples to
illustrate results obtained.
We consider location estimation and illustrate the optimal estimator obtained
in Theorem 5.1 for the case when f0 is exponential random variable f0(x) =
e−x, x ≥ 0, hence fθ is shifted exponential random variable fθ = e−(x−θ), x ≥ θ
and the goal is to estimate θ. As the exponential random variable has a unbounded
support, choosing ψ
′
to be a constant, which minimizes AIF, will lead to an infinite
IF. Hence, we use Theorem 5.1 to characterize the optimal ψ that minimizes AIF
while satisfying the condition that IF ≤ ξ.
For this particular class of distribution, the condition ν∗f0(x) > ϑ∗1F0(x) +
ϑ∗2(1− F0(x)) becomes 0 ≤ x < a with the parameter a chosen as
e−a =
ϑ∗1
ν∗ + ϑ∗1 − ϑ∗2
.(7.1)
Hence we have
ψ
′
(x) =
{
ν∗ + ϑ∗1 − ϑ∗2 − ϑ∗1ex, 0 ≤ x < a;
0, otherwise,
for which the parameters ν∗, ϑ∗1, ϑ∗2 are chosen to satisfy the conditions specified in
Theorem 5.1. After tedious calculation, conditions (5.8) - (5.10) can be simplified
to
(ν∗ + ϑ∗1 − ϑ∗2)(1− e−a)− ϑ∗1a = 1,
ϑ∗1((ν
∗ + ϑ∗1 − ϑ∗2)(a− 1 + e−a)− ϑ∗1(ea − 1) + aϑ∗1 − ξ) = 0,
ϑ∗2((ν
∗ + ϑ∗1 − ϑ∗2)(1− e−a)− ϑ∗1a− ξ) = 0.
From here, we know that if ξ > 1, ϑ∗2 = 0, using this fact along with (7.1), we have
that the conditions are simplified to
ν∗ − aϑ∗1 = 1,
2aϑ∗1 + (a− 2)ν∗ = ξ,
ϑ∗2 = 0.
Using these, we can express ν∗ and ϑ∗1 in terms of a:
ν∗ =
ξ + 2
a
,
ϑ∗1 =
ξ + 2− a
a2
.
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FIG 2. The solution of a
Finally, for any given ξ > 1, the value of a can be determined by (7.1), which is
simplified to
e−a =
ϑ∗1
ν∗ + ϑ∗1 − ϑ∗2
=
ξ + 2− a
(ξ + 1)a+ ξ + 2
.(7.2)
It is easy to check that, for any given ξ > 1, there is always a unique positive
solution to (7.2). For example, Figure 2 illustrates the solution for a when ξ = 3.
In this figure, the dotted curve is the right side of (7.2) and the solid curve is the left
side of (7.2). From the figure, we know that these two curves have two intersections
a = 0 and a = 4.8. With these parameters, we know that
ψ
′
(x) =
{
1.0417− 0.0087ex, 0 ≤ x ≤ 4.8;
0, otherwise,
(7.3)
hence the optimal ψ is
ψ
′
(x) =
{
ξ, x ≥ 4.8;
1.0417x− 0.0087(ex − 1)− 1, 0 ≤ x ≤ 4.8.(7.4)
Figure 3 illustrates the obtained ψ(x) for the case with ξ = 3.
Figure 4 illustrates the tradeoff curve between AIF and IF. We obtain this curve
by solving (7.2) and other parameters using different values of ξ. As we can see
from the curve, as ξ increases, AIF decreases. Furthermore, the value of AIF con-
verges to 1, the lower bound established in Section 5.1.1.
8. Conclusion. Motivated by recent data analytics applications, we have stud-
ied adversarial robustness of robust estimators. We have introduced the concept
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FIG 4. Tradeoff between AIF and IF of location estimator for exponential random variables.
of AIF to quantify an estimator’s sensitivity to such adversarial attacks and have
provided an approach to characterize AIF for given robust estimator. We have fur-
ther designed optimal estimators that minimize AIF. From this characterization, we
have identified a tradeoff between AIF and IF, and have designed estimators that
strike a desirable tradeoff between these two quantities.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THEOREM ??
From (3.1), we know that TN and x satisfy
N∑
n=1
ψ(xn, TN ) = 0.
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Hence, we have
∂
∂xn
TN =
− ∂∂x [ψ]x=xn,θ=TN
N∑
n=1
∂
∂θ [ψ]x=xn,θ=TN
.(A.1)
Based on Taylor expansion, we have
TN (x + ∆x)− TN (x) =
N∑
n=1
∆xn
∂
∂xn
TN + higher order terms.
When η is small, the adversary can solve the following problem and obtain an
o(η) optimal solution
min
∆x
−
N∑
n=1
∆xncn,
s.t. ||∆x||pp ≤ Nηp,(A.2)
in which
cn :=
∂
∂xn
TN .
For p = 1, this is a linear programing problem, whose solution is simple. In par-
ticular, let n∗ = arg max
n
| ∂∂xnTN |, which is the same as arg maxn
∣∣ ∂
∂x [ψ]x=xn,θ=TN
∣∣
due to (A.1), it is easy to check that we have
∆x∗n∗ = sign
{
∂
∂xn∗
TN
}
Nη,
and ∆x∗n = 0, ∀n 6= n∗. Hence,
AIF(ψ,x, 1) = N
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂xn∗ TN
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣N ∂∂x [ψ]x=xn∗ ,θ=TN ∣∣∣∣∣∣ N∑
n=1
∂
∂θ [ψ]x=xn,θ=TN
∣∣∣∣ .
For p > 1, (A.2) is a convex optimization problem. To solve this, we form
Lagrange
L(∆x, λ) = −
N∑
n=1
∆xncn + λ
(||∆x||pp −Nηp) .
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The corresponding optimality conditions are:
−cn + λ∗psign(∆x∗n)|∆x∗n|p−1 = 0,∀n(A.3)
λ∗ ≥ 0,
λ∗(||∆x∗||pp −Nηp) = 0.
From (A.3), we know that λ∗ 6= 0, hence
||∆x∗||pp = Nηp,(A.4)
and
sign(∆x∗n)|∆x∗n|p−1 =
cn
λ∗p
.(A.5)
From (A.5) and the fact that λ∗p is positive, we know sign(∆x∗n) = sign(cn),
and hence we have
|∆x∗n|p−1 =
|cn|
λ∗p
,
which can be simplified further to
∆x∗n =
( |cn|
λ∗p
)1/(p−1)
sign(cn).
Combining these with (A.4), we obtain the value of λ∗:
λ∗ =
1
p

N∑
n=1
|cn|p/(p−1)
Nηp

(p−1)/p
.
As the result, we have
∆x∗n =
|cn|1/(p−1)(N)1/p
(
∑ |cn|p/(p−1))1/p sign(cn)η.
Hence,
AIF(ψ,x, p) =
∑
cn
|cn|1/(p−1)(N)1/p
(
∑ |cn|p/(p−1))1/p sign(cn)
=
N∑
n=1
|cn|p/(p−1)(
1
N
∑ |cn|p/(p−1))1/p .
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Using (A.1), we can further simplify the expression to
AIF(ψ,x, p) =
(
1
N
N∑
n=1
∣∣∣ ∂∂xn [ψ]x=xn,θ=TN ∣∣∣ pp−1)
p−1
p
∣∣∣∣ 1N N∑
n=1
∂
∂θ [ψ]x=xn,θ=TN
∣∣∣∣ .
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM ??
As ψ
′
(x) ≥ 0, we have EF0 [ψ
′
(X)] > 0, and sup
x
|ψ(x)| is either ψ(∞) or
−ψ(−∞). Hence for p = 2, the optimization problem (5.4) is equivalent to
min
EF0 [ψ
′
(X)2]
(EF0 [ψ
′(X)])2
s.t.
ψ(−∞) + ∫∞−∞ ψ′(x)dx
EF0 [ψ
′(X)]
≤ ξ,
−ψ(−∞)
EF0 [ψ
′(X)]
≤ ξ,
ψ(−∞) + EF0
[∫ X
−∞
ψ
′
(t)dt
]
= 0,
ψ
′ ≥ 0.
As the objective function does not involve ψ(−∞), we can first solve
min
EF0 [ψ
′
(X)2]
(EF0 [ψ
′(X)])2
,
s.t.
−EF0
[∫ X
−∞ ψ
′
(t)dt
]
+
∫∞
−∞ ψ
′
(x)dx
EF0 [ψ
′(X)]
≤ ξ,
EF0
[∫ X
−∞ ψ
′
(t)dt
]
EF0 [ψ
′(X)]
≤ ξ,
ψ
′
(x) ≥ 0.
After obtaining the solution, we can simply set ψ(−∞) = −EF0
[∫ X
−∞ ψ
′
(t)dt
]
to
make ψ Fisher consistent.
To simplify the notation, in the remainder of the proof, we will use g(x) to
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denote ψ
′
(x). We now further simplify the optimization problem. First, we have
EF0
[∫ X
−∞
g(t)dt
]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
f0(x)
[∫ x
−∞
g(t)dt
]
dx
=
∫ ∞
−∞
g(t)
[∫ ∞
t
f0(x)dx
]
dt
=
∫ ∞
−∞
g(t) [1− F0(t)] dt.(B.1)
Coupled with the fact that g(x) ≥ 0 and f0(x) ≥ 0, the optimization above is
equivalent to
min
∫∞
−∞ g
2(x)f0(x)dx(∫∞
−∞ g(x)f0(x)dx
)2 ,
s.t.
∫ ∞
−∞
g(x)F0(x)dx ≤ ξ
∫ ∞
−∞
g(x)f0(x)dx,∫ ∞
−∞
g(x) [1− F0(x)] dx ≤ ξ
∫ ∞
−∞
g(x)f0(x)dx,
g(x) ≥ 0.
It is clear that the optimization problem is scale invariant in the sense that if
g∗(x) is a solution to this problem, then for any positive constant c, cg∗(x) is also
a solution to this problem. As a result, without loss of generality, we can assume∫∞
−∞ g(x)f0(x)dx = 1. Using this, we can further simplify the optimization prob-
lem to
min
1
2
∫ ∞
−∞
g2(x)f0(x)dx,
s.t.
∫ ∞
−∞
g(x)f0(x)dx = 1,∫ ∞
−∞
g(x)F0(x)dx ≤ ξ,∫ ∞
−∞
g(x) [1− F0(x)] dx ≤ ξ,
g(x) ≥ 0.
To solve this functional minimization problem, we first form the Lagrangian
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function
L = 1
2
∫ ∞
−∞
g2(x)f0(x)dx+ ν
(
−
∫ ∞
−∞
g(x)f0(x)dx+ 1
)
− λ(x)g(x)
+ϑ1
(∫ ∞
−∞
g(x)F0(x)dx− ξ
)
+ ϑ2
(∫ ∞
−∞
g(x) [1− F0(x)] dx− ξ
)
.
Let H = 12g
2(x)f0(x) − νg(x)f0(x) + ϑ1g(x)F0(x) + ϑ2g(x)(1 − F0(x)) −
λ(x)g(x). As no derivative g
′
(x) is involved in H , the optimality condition Euler-
Lagrange equation [9]
∂H
∂g
− d
dx
(
∂H
∂g′
)
= 0
simplifies to
g∗(x)f0(x)− ν∗f0(x) + ϑ∗2 + (ϑ∗1 − ϑ∗2)F0(x)− λ∗(x) = 0,(B.2)
in which the parameters ϑ∗1 ≥ 0, ϑ∗2 ≥ 0, λ∗(x) ≥ 0 satisfy [8]∫ ∞
−∞
g∗(x)f0(x)dx = 1,
ϑ∗1
(∫ ∞
−∞
g∗(x)F0(x)dx− ξ
)
= 0,
ϑ∗2
(∫ ∞
−∞
g∗(x) [1− F0(x)] dx− ξ
)
= 0,
λ∗(x)g(x) ≥ 0.(B.3)
From (B.2), for x in the range of f0(x), we have
g∗(x) =
λ∗(x) + ν∗f0(x)− ϑ∗2 − (ϑ∗1 − ϑ∗2)F0(x)
f0(x)
.
Combining this with the condition (B.3), we know that if ν∗f0(x)−ϑ∗2− (ϑ∗1−
ϑ∗2)F0(x) > 0, then λ∗(x) = 0. On the other hand, if ν∗f0(x) − ϑ∗2 − (ϑ∗1 −
ϑ∗2)F0(x) < 0, then g∗(x) = 0. As a result, we have
g∗(x) =
{
ν∗ − ϑ∗2+(ϑ∗1−ϑ∗2)F0(x)f0(x) , ν∗f0(x) > ϑ∗1F0(x) + ϑ∗2(1− F0(x));
0, otherwise,
which completes the proof.
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APPENDIX C: PROOF OF THEOREM ??
First of all, minimizing (5.11) is same as solving
min
EF1
[
ψ
′
(X)2
]
(EF1 [Xψ
′(X)])
2 ,(C.1)
s.t. EF1 [ψ(X)] = ψ(−∞) + EF1
[∫ X
−∞
ψ
′
(t)dt
]
= 0,(C.2)
in which the condition EF1 [ψ(X)] = 0 ensures that the estimator is Fisher consis-
tent.
As ψ(−∞) does not appear in the objective function, we can solve (C.1) without
the constraint (C.2) first. After that, we can simply set
ψ(−∞) = −EF1
[∫ X
−∞
ψ
′
(t)dt
]
so that the constraint (C.2) will be satisfied. Furthermore, similar to the proof of
Theorem 5.1, to simplify the notation, we will use g(x) to denote ψ
′
(x). It is clear
from (C.1) that the cost function is scale-invariant. Hence, without loss of gen-
erality, we can assume (EF1 [Xg(X)])
2 = 1, for which we can further focus on
EF1 [Xg(X)] = 1. Combining all these together, the optimization problem can be
converted to
min
1
2
∫ ∞
−∞
g2(x)f1(x)dx,
s.t.
∫ ∞
−∞
xg(x)f1(x)dx = 1.
For this calculus of variations problem, we form Lagrange function
L =
∫ ∞
−∞
1
2
g2(x)f1(x)dx+ ν
(
−
∫ ∞
−∞
xg(x)f1(x)dx− 1
)
.
The corresponding Euler-Lagrange equation can be simplified to
g∗(x)f1(x)− ν∗xf1(x) = 0,(C.3)
and the optimal value of ν∗ is selected to satisfy the condition∫ ∞
−∞
xg∗(x)f1(x)dx = 1.(C.4)
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From (C.3), we know that in the range of X where f1(x) > 0, g∗(x) = ν∗x.
Plugging this into (C.4), we obtain
ν∗ =
1∫∞
−∞ x
2f1(x)dx
.
As the result, for x in the range of f1(x), the optimal g∗(x) is
g∗(x) =
x
EF1 [X2]
,
and ψ(−∞) = −EF1
[∫ X
−∞ g(t)dt
]
.
APPENDIX D: PROOF OF THEOREM ??
Following the same strategy as those in the proof of Theorem 5.1, we can first
solve the following problem
min
EF1
[
ψ
′
(X)2
]
(EF1 [Xψ
′(X)])
2 ,
s.t. −EF1
[∫ X
−∞
ψ
′
(t)dt
]
+
∫ ∞
−∞
ψ
′
(t)dt ≤ ξ
∣∣∣EF1 [Xψ′(X)]∣∣∣ ,
EF1
[∫ X
−∞
ψ
′
(t)dt
]
≤ ξ
∣∣∣EF1 [Xψ′(X)]∣∣∣ ,
ψ
′
(x) ≥ 0,
and then set ψ(−∞) = −EF1
[∫ X
−∞ ψ
′
(t)dt
]
to satisfy the Fisher consistent con-
straint (5.14).
Now, we consider two different cases depending on whether EF1 [Xψ
′
(X)] is
positive or negative. In the following, to simplify notation, we will use g(x) to
denote ψ
′
(x).
We will solve the case with EF1 [Xg(X)] > 0 in detail. The caseEF1 [Xg(X)] <
0 can be solved in the similar manner. With EF1 [Xg(X)] > 0, the optimization
problem is same as
min
EF1
[
g2(X)
]
(EF1 [Xg(X)])
2 ,
s.t. −EF1
[∫ X
−∞
g(t)dt
]
+
∫ ∞
−∞
g(t)dt ≤ ξEF1 [Xg(X)],
EF1
[∫ X
−∞
g(t)dt
]
≤ ξEF1 [Xg(X)],
g(x) ≥ 0.
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Similar to the optimization problems in Theorem 5.1 and 5.2, the optimization
problem is scale-invariant, and hence without loss of generality, we can focus on
EF1 [Xg(X)] = 1. Furthermore, similar to (B.1), we have EF1
[∫ X
−∞ g(t)dt
]
=∫∞
−∞ g(t) [1− F1(t)] dt. The problem is then converted to
min
∫ ∞
−∞
g2(x)f1(x)dx,
s.t.
∫ ∞
−∞
xg(x)f1(x)dx = 1,∫ ∞
−∞
g(x)F1(x)dx ≤ ξ,∫ ∞
−∞
g(x)[1− F1(x)]dx ≤ ξ,
g(x) ≥ 0.
To solve this functional minimization problem, we first form the Lagrangian
function
L = 1
2
∫ ∞
−∞
g2(x)f1(x)dx+ ν
(
−
∫ ∞
−∞
xg(x)f1(x)dx+ 1
)
− λ(x)g(x)
+ϑ1
(∫ ∞
−∞
g(x)F1(x)dx− ξ
)
+ ϑ2
(∫ ∞
−∞
g(x) [1− F1(x)] dx− ξ
)
.
Let F = 12g
2(x)f1(x)− νxg(x)f1(x) + ϑ1g(x)F1(x) + ϑ2g(x)(1− F1(x))−
λ(x)g(x). As no derivative g
′
(x) is involved in F , the Euler-Lagrange equation
∂F
∂g
− d
dx
(
∂F
∂g′
)
= 0
simplifies to
g∗(x)f1(x)− ν∗xf1(x) + ϑ∗2 + (ϑ∗1 − ϑ∗2)F1(x)− λ∗(x) = 0,(D.1)
in which the parameters ϑ∗1 ≥ 0, ϑ∗2 ≥ 0, λ∗(x) ≥ 0 satisfy∫ ∞
−∞
xg∗(x)f1(x)dx = 1,
ϑ∗1
(∫ ∞
−∞
g∗(x)F1(x)dx− ξ
)
= 0,
ϑ∗2
(∫ ∞
−∞
g∗(x) [1− F1(x)] dx− ξ
)
= 0,
λ∗(x)g∗(x) ≥ 0.(D.2)
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From (D.1), for those x with f1(x) > 0, we have
g∗(x) =
λ∗(x) + ν∗xf1(x)− ϑ∗2 − (ϑ∗1 − ϑ∗2)F1(x)
f1(x)
.
Combining this with the condition (D.2), we know that if ν∗xf1(x) − ϑ∗2 −
(ϑ∗1 − ϑ∗2)F1(x) > 0, then λ∗(x) = 0. On the other hand, if ν∗f1(x)− ϑ∗2 − (ϑ∗1 −
ϑ∗2)F1(x) < 0, then g∗(x) = 0. As the result, we have
g∗(x) =
{
ν∗x− ϑ∗2+(ϑ∗1−ϑ∗2)F1(x)f1(x) , ν∗xf1(x) > ϑ∗1F1(x) + ϑ∗2(1− F1(x));
0, otherwise.
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